We study a sample of Form 13F filings where fund advisors seek confidential treatment for some, or all, of their 13(f)-reportable positions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information we find that confidential positions earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period. We also find that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions that are more susceptible to front-running. Overall, our analysis highlights important benefits of reduced disclosure that are relevant to the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency.
I. Introduction
A basic challenge facing hedge fund industry participants and regulators is determining the extent to which the composition and performance of investment portfolios should be publicly disclosed. Increased portfolio disclosure, and the associated increased transparency, is considered beneficial to the extent that it allows investors to make more informed investment allocation decisions and reduces potential agency costs that can arise when managerial actions are more opaque.
Increased transparency,
however, comes at a cost if it reveals proprietary information that allows competitors to free-ride on a fund manager's efforts to identify profitable investments and trading strategies. 1 Increased transparency is also costly when it allows front-runners to trade against a fund that is in the process of accumulating or disposing of a position. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven (2004) demonstrate that hypothetical "copycat" funds created by mimicking the portfolio holdings of actively managed mutual funds earn after expense returns that are indistinguishable from the copied funds.
Transparency is costly in these regards, not only because of its negative effect on the disclosing fund's profits, but also (from a policy perspective) because it reduces fund manager incentives to become informed, thereby harming price discovery. An assessment of the importance of protecting the ability to profit on proprietary information through reduced disclosure is complicated by the fact that such information, by definition, is difficult to identify. In this paper we side-step this issue by examining a sample of 13F filings of hedge fund holdings where fund managers seek confidential 2 treatment by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of some or all of their portfolio positions.
Hedge fund and other institutional investment managers who exercise investment discretion over $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities are required to report their quarterly holdings on Form 13F to the SEC within 45 days of each quarter-end.
However, managers may request confidential treatment to delay public disclosure of some or all of their holdings. Holdings that are kept confidential at the time of the original 13F confidential treatment filing are eventually released to the public at a later date through a Form 13F "add new holdings" Amendment. The ability to examine the characteristics and stock price performance of these confidential positions allows for a useful laboratory in which to develop a better understanding of the determinants of hedge fund managers' disclosure decisions and to contribute to the policy debate on optimal hedge fund disclosure.
Our analysis focuses on all Form 13F confidential filings by a sample of 250 hedge fund managers that file Form 13F over the period 1999 to 2006. We find that securities which are kept confidential at the time of the original 13F filing earn positive and significant abnormal returns over the post-filing confidential period; i.e., from the time of the original 13F filing up until the time that the confidential positions are ultimately revealed to the public through a 13F Amendment filing. In contrast, those securities that are disclosed at the time of the original filing do not exhibit abnormal stock price performance over this same time period. A probit analysis finds statistically and economically significant evidence that confidential treatment requests are more likely for individual positions that perform well over the confidential period. These results suggest that hedge funds avoid disclosure to protect valuable proprietary information and thereby highlight a benefit of allowing confidential treatment and less transparency. 3, 4 In addition to examining how (forward-looking) confidential period returns affect the disclosure decision, we also investigate how past returns (measured over the filing quarter) affect the likelihood of a confidential treatment request. To the extent that hedge fund managers seek to protect profitable ongoing investment strategies, we would expect past returns to be positively associated with the likelihood of seeking confidential
treatment. An alternative possibility is that managers seek confidentially in order to strategically hide past losers or "window-dress" their portfolios.
5 4 seek confidential treatment for positions that have performed well in the past. We find no evidence consistent with the use of confidential treatment to hide past losers.
We also investigate the extent to which the liquidity of individual holdings affects the disclosure decision. Hedge funds that are seeking to accumulate or dispose of an illiquid position may seek confidentiality to avoid the costs of being front-run; frontrunning costs can be potentially severe for illiquid securities due to the larger price impact of advanced trading. In addition, because of concern about price impact, the accumulation and disposition of illiquid positions is done more slowly making it more likely that such activities are ongoing at the time of a 13F filing and thereby making a confidential treatment request more likely. Consistent with these arguments, we find that confidentially held securities are significantly more likely to be illiquid, as measured by Amihud (2002) and by whether the confidential request pertains to less liquid 13(f) -reportable non-equity positions, like equity options and corporate debt.
Finally, we examine whether greater usage of confidential treatment contributes to the success of the advisor's hedge fund investors. Net-of-fees, we find that portfolio returns are positively related to greater usage of confidential treatment in the prior quarter. Specifically, an increase in the percentage of confidential securities from 0% to 25% is associated with a significant increase in subsequent monthly portfolio returns of about 50 basis points. These results suggest that the gains associated with confidential treatment are at least partly captured by hedge fund investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data.
Section 3 discusses the methodology and empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
B. Sample Formation
We form our sample of hedge fund managers using the Lipper/TASS database and the Bloomberg list of all 13(f)-obligated hedge fund managers. These managers are then manually matched with Edgar to identify which managers are subject to Section 13(f). We then identify all 13F filings by these managers using Edgar. The sample period runs from the first quarter of 1999 (the first quarter for which 13F filings are available in electronic format from Edgar) through the fourth quarter of 2006. Although downloading the individual 13F filings is uncomplicated, the formatting is complex and difficult to sort out due to manager-specific idiosyncrasies in reporting styles. We therefore focus our analysis on a representative sample of 250 advisors. 
C. Analysis Periods
We consider three distinct analysis periods associated with 13F filings: the quarter that the 13F filing is reporting on (filing quarter); the period from the quarter end to the filing date of either the regular or confidential 13F filing (filing period); and the period from the date of the confidential 13F filing to the date that the confidential holdings are released to the public through an "add new holdings" 13F Amendment filing (confidential period). The three periods are illustrated in Figure 1 . Turning to investment performance, Panel A shows the average value-weighted characteristic-based-benchmark-adjusted returns to the equity positions reported on Form 13F for the filing and post-filing quarters. Filers as preliminary evidence consistent with the idea that confidential treatment is used to protect private information about stock fundamentals.
Next we use a probit model to explicitly study the ex-ante reasons why certain advisors that are subject to section 13(f) disclosure rules seek confidentiality.
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The results strongly suggest that ex-ante larger and better performing managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in AUM is associated with a 0.88% increase in the probability of seeking confidential treatment during the quarter (Model 1). This effect nearly doubles (1.42%, Model 4) for a one standard deviation increase in market-model alpha. Both estimates are significant at the 1% level. Our results are similar for other performance measures (mean return, Sharpe Ratio) and when we use equally-weighted (vs. asset-weighted) averages of the advisor's underlying fund returns. The effects of liquidity (lockup vs. notice) and fees (management vs. incentive) are mixed, although both notice periods and incentive fees are associated with a higher likelihood of seeking confidential treatment. Overall, the Table 3 reports the results from a pooled estimation in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals one if the advisor files a confidential treatment-related amendment during the quarter. As noted above, our sample includes amendments corresponding to both approved and denied requests, so our dependent variable indeed measures whether confidentiality is being sought. All explanatory variables are measured using TASS data at the end of the prior quarter and include the natural logarithm of assets under management (AUM) and the mean return, Sharpe Ratio, and market-model alpha of monthly returns. Advisor-level returns are asset-weighted averages of the underlying fund returns.
evidence here indicates that confidential treatment requests are more likely among managers with a capacity for informed trading, as reflected in ex-ante performance measures. Table 4 provides summary statistics on the reported holdings and confidential holdings for our sample of 187 Form 13F filings where requests for confidential treatment are made. As indicated earlier, we are able to identify the confidential holdings that are not disclosed at the time of the original filing, by examining 13F "add new holdings" amendments that later reveal positions that were undisclosed at the time of the original 13F filing. The results in Table 4 show that the undisclosed holdings in 13F
III. Empirical Results

A. Reported and Confidential Holdings: Descriptive Statistics
confidential treatment filings constitute a non-trivial fraction of the overall market value of the reportable hedge fund positions. Specifically, the median percentage market value of the confidential holdings is 21.18% of the combined total of the disclosed and undisclosed holdings. With respect to the number of holdings, the median percentage of undisclosed positions is 20% of all holdings.
B. Probit Analysis of Reported Holdings and Confidential Holdings
We employ a probit analysis to analyze the determinants of hedge fund manager decisions on whether to seek confidential treatment of individual reportable 13(f)
positions. In order to avoid giving larger weight to 13F filings that have larger numbers of holdings, we conduct the probit analysis at the portfolio level rather than at the individual holding level. Specifically, for each 13F confidential treatment filing we form two portfolios of securities: one made up of the "Reported Holdings" and the other made up of the "Confidential Holdings". The dependent variable in the probit is set equal to one for the Confidential Holdings portfolios and is set equal to zero for the Reported Holdings portfolios.
To provide evidence on the proprietary information hypothesis, we employ several measures. The first measure is the cumulative abnormal portfolio return over the confidential period, i.e., over the period from the original 13F confidential treatment filing to the date of the "add new holdings" 13F Amendment filing where the confidential holdings are disclosed to the public. In effect, the confidential period abnormal return serves as a proxy for the value of the private information that the manager has at the time the decision is made on whether to seek confidential treatment for certain holdings. The proprietary information hypothesis predicts that the average confidential period abnormal return will be larger for the Confidential Holdings portfolios relative to that observed for the Reported Holdings portfolios. With respect to the probit analysis, the proprietary information hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on the confidential period abnormal portfolio return.
In addition to the confidential period return, we also investigate the effect that the filing quarter abnormal return has on the decision to seek confidentiality of individual 13(f)-reportable positions. Unlike the confidential period return, which is forward looking, hedge fund advisors know the filing quarter returns of the individual holdings at the time the decision of whether or not to seek confidential treatment is made. To the extent that advisors seek to hide profitable ongoing investment strategies, we expect a positive coefficient on the filing period abnormal return in the probit analysis.
We also test the proprietary information hypothesis by considering the extent to which the Reported Holdings and Confidential Holdings portfolios are comprised of stock as opposed to other types of securities. Specifically, for each portfolio we define the Stock Ratio as the total number of stock holdings divided by the total number of all portfolio holdings:
(1)
Portfolio holdings that are not stock consist primarily of options and convertible debt. As discussed earlier, options provide a levered channel through which traders can profit from their private information regarding the underlying stocks. Options also allow traders to profit from private information regarding the volatility of underlying stocks.
Similar arguments also apply to convertible debt. Thus, we expect that portfolio holdings are more likely to contain private information the higher the proportion of non-stock holdings. A negative coefficient on Stock Ratio would be consistent with the proprietary information hypothesis.
We use three illiquidity measures to test the importance of how the liquidity of hedge fund positions affects the disclosure decision: the Stock Ratio (as just discussed), (2) where Illiq Q is quarterly illiquidity, N is the number of days in the quarter. ret t , vol t , and prc t are the daily return, trading volume, and the price on day t, respectively.
We employ size as a measure of illiquidity as stocks of smaller firms are in general more illiquid. We measure size as the market capitalization of the firm's equity at the quarterend preceding the 13F filing quarter. The hypothesis that hedge funds are more likely to require confidential treatment of illiquid positions predicts negative coefficients on the Stock Ratio and size, and a positive coefficient on the Amihud illiquidity measure.
We include book-to-market, momentum, and the filing period return as control variables. Momentum is measured as the 12-month cumulative raw return preceding the 13F filing quarter. All independent variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a variance of one. We also normalize the stock return measures (for the filing quarter, filing period, and confidential period) to average daily returns. The probit regressions are estimated with advisor and time fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered with respect to time.
The results of our probit analysis are presented in Table 5 . The table shows the results of six specifications that differ on (i) how cumulative stock returns are calculated (raw returns, market-adjusted returns, and characteristic-based-benchmark-adjusted returns) and (ii) by whether or not size is included as an independent variable. In addition to reporting coefficients and t-statistics, the table also reports marginal effects for each probit model. Consistent with the proprietary information hypothesis, we find for all six specifications that the coefficient on the confidential period return is positive and statistically significant. Focusing on the specification in column 5, the coefficient implies a marginal effect of 0.30, which indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the confidential period return is associated with a 30.0% increase in the probability that the manager chooses to seek confidentiality. This result is robust across each measure of portfolio returns.
We also find that the coefficient on the filing quarter return is positive and significant across all six specifications. This finding implies that managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of positions that have performed well in the past.
This result is consistent with the proprietary information hypothesis that managers seek to keep ongoing profitable investment strategies confidential. Furthermore, the positive and significant coefficient on the filing quarter return is not consistent with an alternative hypothesis that hedge fund managers attempt to hide past losers in order to "window dress" their portfolios.
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Also consistent with the proprietary information hypothesis we find that the coefficient on Stock Ratio is negative and significant. This finding implies hedge fund 11 We note that the coefficient on the filing period return is not significant. One possible explanation for this finding is that the filing period return horizon is relatively short. Another possibility is that the decision to seek confidentiality may be tied to whether or not the private information is revealed during the filing period.
managers that seek confidentiality are more likely to request confidential treatment of non-stock positions than stock positions. Focusing on the specification in column 1, the coefficient implies that a one standard deviation decrease in Stock Ratio is associated with a 12.9% increase in the likelihood of confidential treatment.
The negative coefficient on Stock Ratio is also consistent with the hypothesis that hedge funds are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid positions. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on size is also consistent with the illiquidity hypothesis; the smaller the size, the more likely managers choose to seek confidential treatment of the position. We also run the probit regression after excluding the size variable, because the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is highly correlated with size. In all three specifications, the coefficient on illiquidity is positive, but it is only significant in the last specification.
In summary, the results of our probit analysis suggest that protection of proprietary information and concerns about illiquidity are important to the hedge fund managers' disclosure decision. The evidence is not consistent with managers seeking confidential treatment to window-dress portfolios in order to hide poor past performance.
C. Abnormal Returns of Confidential Holdings Over the Confidential Period
The results of the probit analysis suggest that hedge fund managers are more likely to seek confidential treatment of those securities that subsequently have greater post-filing returns as measured over the confidential period. In this section, we test whether the confidential holdings actually outperform their benchmarks. The results of this analysis are not only of interest to the disclosure decision that hedge fund managers make, but also to the broader question of the extent to which hedge fund performance reflects managerial skill; i.e., choosing not to disclose securities that subsequently perform well would be inconsistent with luck driving the returns.
To test for abnormal stock price performance over the confidential period, we follow the standardized abnormal return approach for measuring statistical significance outlined in Dodd and Warner (1983) . Two aspects of this method are especially important for our purposes. First, the method allows us to control for the fact that the interval over which confidential period returns are measured varies across our sample of 13F confidential treatment filings. As discussed earlier, the confidential return interval varies across managers and over time because the confidential period itself is part of the confidentiality request. In addition, the standardized abnormal return procedure allows us to control for differences in portfolio variances that can be driven, in part, by differences in the number of stocks that comprise each confidential treatment portfolio.
We assume that continuously compounded excess returns for portfolio j at day t (denoted by ER j,t ) have a normal distribution with mean zero and variance of . The cumulative excess return (CER j,t ) for each portfolio j is the sum of the continuous compounded returns over the confidential period from day d 1j (the 13F filing date) to day d 2j (the "add new holdings" Amendment date). Specifically,
The cumulative excess returns are standardized by dividing the estimated standard deviation times the square root of the number of days in the confidential period for that portfolio:
The resulting standardized cumulative excess return (SCER) is assumed to have a standard normal distribution with a zero mean and a variance of one. The average standardized cumulative excess return (across portfolios) multiplied by the square root of the number of the portfolios N is assumed to be unit normal.
We estimate the standard deviations of portfolio excess returns using the 150 trading days preceding the 13F filing quarter, with a requirement of a minimum of 30 non-missing daily excess return observations. If there are less than 30 non-missing observations available, the 150 trading days after the confidential period are also used.
The filing quarter, the filing period, and the confidential period are also included in the estimation if there are still less than 30 non-missing observations available to estimate the standard deviation. Overall, the results here are consistent with the proprietary information hypothesis that hedge fund managers seek confidential treatment to protect private information about stock fundamentals and trading strategies.
13,14
12 As noted earlier, 18 confidential treatment requests in our sample were denied by the SEC corresponding to seven separate advisors. Our findings here are qualitatively unchanged when these filings are excluded from the sample. In untabulated analysis we find that denied requests tend to have more stocks and weaker filing quarter returns. Moreover, the confidential period abnormal returns to confidential positions that were denied by the SEC are insignificantly different from zero. This finding is consistent with the SEC's authority to deny confidential treatment requests that are not aimed at protecting ongoing profitable transactions and trading strategies. We caution that it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding the denied filings given the small sample size.
D. Hedge Fund Portfolio Returns and Confidential Holdings
Our analysis in the previous section focuses on the abnormal returns to undisclosed equity positions to provide evidence that hedge fund advisors use confidential treatment to protect private information about stock fundamentals. Although we find that undisclosed positions earn positive abnormal returns over the confidential period, two questions remain unanswered. First, how do positions that do not require disclosure (for example, short positions) perform over the confidential period? Second, to what extent does confidential treatment contribute to the success of hedge fund investors? To address these questions, we study the overall portfolio returns of the TASS-matched subsample for which portfolio returns are available.
We estimate the following pooled regression model to test whether usage of confidential treatment is a determinant of portfolio returns:
We also examine (as suggested by the referee) the stock price performance over the 12 months following the confidential period (in the spirit of Coval and Stafford (2007)) for evidence of whether there is a reversal in stock price performance. Our examination shows no evidence of a reversal for either the full sample or the subsample of firms where there has been an accumulation in shares over the confidential period (and where we would most likely observe a price pressure effect). This bolsters confidence in our conclusion that the confidential period abnormal reflects proprietary information that hedge fund managers have at the time they make the decision to seek confidentiality.
where u it is a zero-mean independent noise term which is uncorrelated with each independent variable. The dependent variable, PRET i,t+k is the excess portfolio return of advisor i during the k th month (k =1,2,3) following quarter t. Excess returns are computed by subtracting the one-month Treasury bill rate from raw returns.
The key independent variable in the above regression model is based on a fund manager's reported holdings at the end of each quarter. CTUSE it is the proportion of advisor i's 13(f)-reportable holdings in quarter t that are reported separately (not reported to the public) in a confidential treatment filing. From γ we can infer the marginal effect of the proportion of undisclosed holdings (in a confidential treatment filing) on the monthly portfolio returns over the post-filing quarter. Our earlier finding that the positions reported in confidential treatment filings are associated with abnormal stock returns suggests that an investment in the manger's underlying hedge funds will also be profitable. Therefore, to the extent that the funds' other holdings don't offset these gains and that the net gains are not completely captured by the hedge fund advisors, we expect the coefficient on CTUSE to have a positive sign.
The regression model also includes the monthly return on the value-weighted NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ index minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (MKTRF).
Models relating portfolio returns with fund attributes may be misspecified if variation in the attribute proxies for variation in the fund's exposure to factor risk. This concern is relevant here because we find that the characteristics of confidentially held securities are significantly different from those that are disclosed. For example, option positions are more likely to be reported separately in the confidential treatment filing, and options might significantly alter a fund's risk exposure. Therefore, in the regression we allow a fund advisor's market risk exposure to vary with the extent of confidential treatment. In effect, our approach here represents a conditional performance evaluation model in the sense that we allow a fund's risk exposure to vary across market conditions (see, for example, Ferson and Schadt (1996) ).
We estimate the regression model using all available non-backfilled returns over the 1999-2006 period. Advisor-level returns are equally-weighted averages of their individual fund returns.
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The results, which are reported in Table 7 , show that hedge fund portfolio returns are significantly higher following quarters with greater usage of confidential treatment.
For example, we estimate that an increase in the proportion of confidential positions from 0% to 10% is associated with higher excess portfolio returns of about 21 basis points per month (Model 2). This finding adds to our earlier evidence on the proprietary information hypothesis that is based solely on the observed returns to 13(f)-reportable securities. Specifically, because portfolio returns reflect the performance of both the reportable and non-reportable positions, they provide a more complete measure of the value of the advisor's proprietary information. In addition, because portfolio returns are
As control variables we include the return on size, book-tomarket, and momentum benchmark portfolios, quarterly fixed effects, the advisor's lagged quarterly assets under management (aggregated across funds), and the advisor's lockup and redemption notice period (averages across funds). Standard errors are clustered by quarter and account for heteroskedasticity. measured net of fees, the results here suggest that the gains associated confidential treatment are at least partially captured by hedge fund investors.
IV. Conclusions
In this study, we use a sample of Form 13F confidential treatment filings to investigate the determinants of hedge fund managers' disclosure decisions. Consistent with the hypothesis that managers seek confidentiality to protect proprietary information we find that positions that are not disclosed to the public in confidential treatment filings earn significantly positive abnormal returns over the post-filing period over which the positions are not revealed to the public. We also find that proprietary information (as proxied by the post-filing performance over the confidential period) is an important determinant of the decision to seek confidential treatment of individual positions. These findings, taken together with evidence that fund advisors are more likely to seek confidential treatment of positions that have been performing well in the past, suggest that managers seek confidential treatment in order to protect proprietary information that is used to generate superior returns.
We also find evidence suggesting that hedge fund managers seek confidential treatment in order to avoid the costs of front-running by outsider investors who anticipate a fund's trades and then trade against the fund. Specifically, we find that fund advisors are more likely to seek confidential treatment of illiquid securities which are more susceptible to front-running by third party investors. Reducing front-running costs acts to increase the returns associated with identifying profitable trading strategies.
Finally, our analysis does not reveal a dark side to confidentiality requests by hedge fund managers. Specifically, we do not find any evidence that hedge fund advisors seek confidentiality in order to hide poorly performing fund positions. Furthermore, our analysis of after-fee portfolio returns shows that the gains associated with confidential treatment appear to accrue, at least in part, to hedge fund investors. Overall, our analysis suggests that there are important benefits of reduced disclosure that should be taken into account in the current policy debate on hedge fund transparency. 'Regular Filers' refer to those hedge fund advisors who do not report any amended 13F filing during our sample period. The market value for options is notional since the 13F filing reports the market value of the underlying securities rather than that of the options themselves. 'Filing Quarter' is the quarter that the 13F filing is reporting on and 'Post- Table 4 Characteristics Stock characteristics include log (size), book-to-market ratio, log (illiquidity), and momentum. Size is the market value and book-tomarket ratio is the book value divided by market value. Both size and book-to-market ratio are measured at the quarter-end preceding the filing quarter. Illiquidity is the average daily illiquidity in the quarter preceding the filing quarter, where the daily illiquidity is Independent variables include log(size), book-to-market ratio, log(illiquidity), momentum, filing quarter return, filing period return, confidential period return, and stock ratio. Size is the market value and book-to-market ratio is the book value divided by market value at the quarter end preceding the filing quarter. Illiquidity is the average daily illiquidity in the quarter preceding the filing quarter, where the daily illiquidity is measured as the absolute change in stock return per dollar trading volume on that day (Amihud, 2002) . Momentum is the cumulative raw return of a stock over the 12-month period preceding the filing quarter.
The table shows the results of six specifications that differ on how cumulative stock returns are calculated (raw returns, market-adjusted returns, and characteristic-based-benchmarkadjusted returns) and by whether or not log(size) is included as an independent variable. The market-adjusted returns are equal to raw returns minus the CRSP value-weighted market returns. The characteristic-based-benchmark-adjusted returns are equal to raw returns minus the characteristic-based-benchmark returns (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997) .
The portfolio characteristics and returns are the value-weighted average characteristics and returns of the stocks in each portfolio. Stock ratio is the number of stock holdings divided by the total number of holdings in each portfolio. All independent variables are standardized to have a zero mean and a variance of one. We also normalize the stock return measures (filing quarter, filing period, and confidential period) to average daily returns. Table 6 Portfolio Returns of Reported and Confidential Holdings for Confidential Treatment Filings
This table reports the average returns of 'reported' and 'confidential' holdings portfolios over four analysis periods including the filing quarter, the post-filing quarter, the filing period, and the confidential period. To test for abnormal stock price performance over the confidential period, we follow the standardized abnormal return approach for measuring statistical significance outlined in Dodd and Warner (1983) . We assume that continuously compounded excess returns for portfolio j at day t (denoted by ER j,t ) have a normal distribution with mean zero and variance of . The cumulative excess return (CER j,t ) for each portfolio j is the sum of the 
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We estimate the standard deviations of portfolio excess returns using the 150 trading days preceding the 13F filing quarter, with a requirement of a minimum of 30 non-missing daily excess return observations. If there are less than 30 non-missing observations available, the 150 trading days after the confidential period are also used. The filing quarter, the filing period, and the confidential period are also included in the estimation if there are still less than 30 non-missing observations available to estimate the standard deviation. The average cumulative excess returns (CER) across portfolios of 'reported' or 'confidential' holdings and their statistical significance are reported in the table. The dependent variable ( , + ) is the excess portfolio return of advisor i during the k th month following quarter t (k=1,2,3).
Excess returns are computed by subtracting the one-month Treasury bill rate from raw returns. Advisor-level returns are equally weighted averages of underlying individual fund monthly returns. The key independent variable, , is the proportion of advisor i's 13(f)-reportable holdings in quarter t that are reported separately in a confidential treatment filing. MKTRF is the market return in excess of the one-month Treasury yield. Control variables include the monthly return on size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and momentum (UMD) benchmark portfolios, the advisor's lagged quarterly assets under management, and the advisor's lockup and redemption notice periods. Quarter fixed effects are included in all models. Models 1-2 include portfolio returns that are dated before the fund was added to the database (backfilled data); and Models 3-4 exclude backfilled data. Standard errors are clustered by quarter and account for heteroskedasticity.
(1) R-squared 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.08 *, **, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
